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. Colin W. Evers & Gabriele Lakomski (1991) Knowing
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jJp hdbk, c. A$85
book is
subtitled
"Contemporary
Methodological Controversies in Educational
Administration Research". We are here not talking
about educational administration as such, but
about theories of educational administration, and
at a level of abstraction which many
administrators will find daunting. In describing
prevailing controversies over epistemologies in
educational administration, the authors present
yet another one, namely whether their
.. Quinean/holistic point of view can accommodate
ethics and a rational knowledge without a
foundational justification as flawed as the ones
they criticise.
Many of the chapters had appeared in discrete
form by the two authors in international journals.
They have been pulled together here skilfully and
coherently. One cannot dispute the scholarly
presentation of material.
Educational
administrators such as Griffiths, Greenfield,
Hodgkinson, Hoy, Willower, Sergiovanni,
Kemmis, Bates are discussed in some detail.
Because their administrative policies are
secondary to a pursuit of their epistemological
assumptions, a prior knowledge of their work
makes following the argument much easier.
Writings from Dewey, Taylor, Simon, Gadamer,
Habermas, Giddens, Churchlands provide a
broader post-positivistic epistemological context
to their argument.
The authors begin from the assumption that

"Promoting good rationality is ... a matter of promoting
the kind of reasoning employed in and exhibited by 'our
best theories'" (p. 183). What counts as 'best'? "We
believe that the mistake lies with the epistemological
enterprise offoundational justification ... Foundational
justification proceeds typically by identifying an
epistemically privileged set of claims and then
attempting to use these to justifiJ other claims."
(p.213).

Printed by Rossmoyne Senior High
School, Perth, Western Australia.
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Most of the educational administration theorists
discussed in this book are defined as holding one
of two types of foundationalist theories. Firstly,
the oppositional diversity thesis is held by those who
claim
that
research
paradigms
are
incommensurable. "The scientists who live ill

different paradigms live in different worlds".
Popkewitz (1984, p. 35) for example divides
educational sciences into the three paradigms empirical analytic (quantitative), symbolic
(qualitative and interpretive) and critical (where
political criteria are applied). Burrell and
Morgan's (1982, p. 217) interpretive, functionalist,
radical structuralist and radical humanist
paradigms illustrate another four mutually
exclusive sets of basic assumptions about the way
research relates to the world. Qualitative (action
research) is seen as incommensurable with
quantitative models, because of their different
goals - social improvement or validity.
The second is a complemelltary diversity thesis
which
acknowledges
that
even
the
incommensurable paradigms used by Kuhn,
Newtonian physics and quantum theory,
continue to be used side by side in current
scientific research.
They are simply
acknowledged to be serving different human
purposes. This l1let/lOd%gical pluralism allows
for appropriate ways of approaching different, or
even the same, research problems and supports.
Folk theories can coexist happily with metaanalysis and behavioural science regardless of
their different epistemological assumptions. The
problem of how they can resolve their differences,
or even if they need to, is left unanswered. Evers
and Lakomski are content to avoid detailed
discussion as to how Giddens can maintain the
explanation/understanding distinction, for
instance, simply referring (p. 225) to an
unpublished 1987 paper by Jim Walker. In
admitting the problem of unambiguously
identifying educational research paradigms, they
raise the question of how their own coherent
theory can be placed outside a complementary
diversity thesis. One of their main problems is the
self-reference necessary to pursue a more
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epistemological argument here. To even describe
epistemologies as inadequate on the grounds of
foundationalist theory is to be involved in the
same sort of contradiction-generating paradox as
"This sentence is false", for they must be
criticising them from within an epistemology
which is open to the same criticism.
Evers and Lakomski argue that the very idea of
research paradigms is mistaken and incoherent
because it relies on a notion of observational
truth, a distinction between paradigms and the
'real' world. For them, shared concepts and
justifications, meaning and truth are brought into
a productive relation with one another through
'touchstone' - which denies a distinction between
rationality and content; good and problemsolving; and ethical and empirical claims.
Touchstone is defined (p. 233) as nonfoundationalist because it is merely the shifting
and historically explicable amount of theory that
is shared by rival theories and theorists. All our
beliefs are in principle open to revision not
against how they fit "the real world", but how
they cohere with all of our other beliefs. This is a
holistic theory operating not only according to
empirical adequacy, but to principles of
consistency, simplicity, comprehensiveness,
fecundity, familiarity of principle and explanatory
power (p. 229). So when Evers and Lakomski say
(p. 213) "We do not need alternatives to science: we
need better science", they appear prima facie to have
considerably revised the notion of science.
Logically, there need be no retreat to
foundationalism. What counts as a better science
from a coherentist view? Because it includes
values, it shifts the emphasis from truth to
evidence.
How do we decide in judging
contentious evidence which of the above
principles are overriding? Even by including
explanatory power, Evers and Lakomski are still
begging the question about causal notions versus
intentionality. If they allow reasons the same
explanatory force as causes, as Davidson does,
they might well by-pass it. But they make the
mistake of reverting to a Quinean behaviourism,
in which the meaning of a statement is still
identified with the means of confirming evidence
- they remain verificationists. The requirement of
touchstone says it must be a theory that works,
especially in such problems as getting researchers
out of 'real' offices (p. 229). And the theory must
not only be one which works but one which is seen
to be working, i.e. it is still a behaviouristic view of
science because the principles of simplicity and
parsimony require us to focus on the relatively
superficial aspects of any claim. To remove the
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distinction between ethical and empirical
is in this case to reduce the former to the
Like Ted Trainer (1991) they reduce
concepts or principles to their prudential value
how they work in a shared world of
action. Evers and Lakomski admit they
reductionist, but they do not use the
'behaviourist', because that might
suspiciously like a foundationalist
Quine (1990, pp. 37-8) is more explicit

The behaviourist approach is mandatory.
psychology one mayor may not be
behaviourist, but in linguistics one has
choice. Each of us learns his language
observing other people's verbal behaviour
having his own faltering verbal
observed and reinforced and corrected by
We depend strictly on overt behaviour
observable situations... There is nothing
linguistic meaning beyond what is to be
from overt behaviou r in
circumstances.
A coherence view accounts better than
falsification theory for the
continuing to pursue theories
when presented with particular
examples. But if evidence rests on
evidence rather than paradigm-theory, then
we right to believe:
that if our beliefs are mostly true, then they
mostly coherent?; and
2. that if "many of our beliefs cohere with
1.

others, then many of our beliefs are
(Davidson)?
instance,
Greenfield's
subj
For
apprehension of interpretations and a
embedding of these into explanatory
that invoke an agent's reasons and
motivations is acknowledged as "a rela
autonomous domain of discourse that is

predictively useful and explanatorily economical"
90). But Evers and Lakomski dismiss it as
a folk theory which even if it is
adequate now will prove to be false it is
capable of integration with "the rest of

developing scientific world view". "If humans
complex physical systems and physical science is
(at least in its domain of application), thell if
fundamental theoretical categories of folk theory
not found in physical science, folk theory will
be false." And if the Churchlands' (1
philosophy of mind were true then the above
premises would be true. If intentionalist or
hermeneutic views are dismissed from

theory on the grounds of their truth or
then Evers and Lakomski are operating
a paradigmatic theory which they have
as being foundationalist.
they are using the notion of truth in some sort of
non-foundationalist sense, their coherent
requires
either
a
desperate
or dependence on power politics

reach a decision on the theory which is strongest
present circumstances" p. 233). Is the better
the more popular one?
Amongst
administrators? Or the general
This seems to me to be a dangerous
"m[llll.ll-"~' Because favoured research methods are
.$lJL<,HUU--"'} oriented, are they then the best, even
rest on an outdated foundationalism?
be comprehensive because of their
simply because of their reductive quality
Broglie's quote from physics: There IS
so dangerous as a precise definition "). To
quantitative science over qualitative
may have less to do with truth, even
truth, than political history, and we
worry a bit about the consequence for
and intentions 1.
despite the acknowledged acceptance by even
and Campbell (p. 223) of the limitations
of sole allegiance to a single viewpoint about
knowledge and practice, Evers and Lakomski are
with the foundationalists' problem of an
'>eloisternically privileged set of claims, namely
touchstone of scientific materialism,
much faith in the capacity of
or hermeneutics to overthrow
touchstones. Acknowledging Greenfield's
that the standard of truth is only as
1J1"U'>lLJ<e as the background theories it is being
to adjudicate (p. 79) allows them to rob
schemata of their point. They are
self-referential paradox. To dismiss
beliefs as indicative of mere
diversity
rather
than
eDistemc.lolnciil diversity (p. 224) is simply to
i1111<:t,."tp Evers' and Lakomski's assumption that
knowledge is founded upon scientific method. If
We really want to discard the use of the word
'true' (p. 227), then we have to acknowledge that
touchstone really must be more than the
behaviourist/materialist agenda Evers and
Lakomski have for it. The hermeneuticists who
believe that meaning is meta-empirical may not
be incommensurable with behaviourists, but
merely assign less importance to emp~rical
science within their epistemology. In placmg a
higher priority on meta-empirical matters, they
are merely redefining their touchstone to include
LILIllU.:tLH
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feelings, intentions, desires, understandings as a
valuable component of knowing.
I want mind and matter to be held in equal regard.
by educational administrators and believe they
can do this within a coherent unity theory even If
they have to concede that our conceptual
construction and speculative interpretation is
dependent upon and constructed fron;t within a
sensed world. To accept Churchlands' argument
(1990, p. 87) that "it goes against modem

psychological evidence that one's introspective
judgements are on all fOI!rs with percep~u~l
judgements generally, and proVide knowledge that IS III
110 way distinguished by any special status, purity or
authority" is simply to beg the question as to the
priority of psychological research. Poets and
artists may have as much social efficacy and
certainly provide as much meaning. I believe
(with the poets and artists) in an indubitable
awareness of an individual self which can guide
actions with as much force as external causes, and
becomes more than a Churchlandish neural
network. It uses imagination as well as logic to
draw meaningful associations between theories,
people, situations and experiences. Because we
are working with people, and know our
intentions in dealing with them, our construction
of them as persons rather than historical bundles
of acquired habits, we as educational
administrators have to question further the
arguments underlying the Evers and Lakomski
behaviourist epistemology.
I can accept the need for a coherentist theory
without the Quinean materialism. I am probably
happier with the Davidsonian/Dennett holistic
theory (more compatible with Greenfield and
Sergiovanni) which begins in our sensed world
and constructs a more human shared reality from
that. Ironically, even though Churchland believes
that a completed neuroscience will embody the
essential wisdom about our inner nature, he
leaves space in his final chapter to allow for the
value of introspective consciousness, even if it
becomes little more than awareness of glucose
consumption in the fore-brain, dopamine levels in
the thalamus and so on. Self-awareness is
something Evers and Lakomski say little about
and the phenomenologists place a priority on.
My postgraduate courses on ethics in educational
administration have provided some evidence for
believing that one of the important ways of
knowing educational administration is precisely a
reflection which creates self-awareness in the
educational administrator to think about his/her
own sets of values, and her/his reasons for
holding them as well as testing those assumptions
37
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against the "real world" schools. Ironically,
though its language and erudition make it
difficult to access, this book could well be used to
generate such reflection. There should be more
room within the coherent theory to allow for
further debate between the humanists and the
materialists.

BOOK REVIEW

F. (1989), The Examiner: James Booth and the
of common examinations. University of
Printing Service, Leeds, 1989, pp. viii +

system are often casual and inaC(:urate. Some
quite respectable historians tend to make
commonplace mistakes about the arrival and
impact of examinations. (p. 112).

use of examinations in the educative process
quickly throughout Western education
",.. d o " , " since the time of their central role in the
of educational opportunities
century England. Examination
has been evolutionary and revolutionary
nature, involving a number of stages,
institutions, catalytic events and
reactions. Debate on their role has been
VHLU'ULV continual, at times fierce and sometimes
Teacher educators should be aware
this debate and its historical origins for during
past one hundred and fifty years examining
been at the very heart of the schooling process
in .Western society.

Examinations began to be woven into the fabric of
the education system of Britain during the period
(1852-1857) when James Booth was a member and
later President of the Society for the
Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures and
Commerce, now known as the Royal Society of
Arts. Once they were introduced into the English
education system their use spread "like an
epidemic disease" (p. 111). In his book, The
Examiner, Foden endeavours to add to the history
of education literature regarding the significance
of examinations to the provision of education. He
observes that in traditional educational histories
the introduction of examinations;

END NOTE

1. For instance, see my article "On equitable
cakecutting" (Haynes, 1989) where I argue that Dawkins
presents a case for funding more women in maths and
science on the grounds of equity, but does not argue for
more men in arts and education because he "sees" the
problem of equity I equality through a lens of national
productivity rather than personal rights. He is coherent
and he can provide facts to back up his case, but still
there remain other ways [perhaps less powerful] of
construing the facts, and defining the problem.
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